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BAR BRIEFS 35
BOOK REVIEWS
A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY*
Department of State Publication 2498, Superintendent of
Documents, United States Government Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1946. Pp. xiii, 61; 20 cents; also published
by Doubleday & Co., Garden City, New York, 1946, Pp. 55, 35
cents.*
This is a state paper of which every American, irrespective of
agreement with its conclusions, may well be proud; it is a docu-
ment which deserves even more attention and study than it has
yet received. For qualities of originality, realism, imaginative
boldness and objectivity, in wrestling with a political problem of
the first magnitude, it would be difficult indeed to suggest many
equals. The Report was the work of a Board of Consultants to a
Committee, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State
Acheson, appointed by the Secretary of State to study the subject
of international control of atomic energy.' " It was submitted to
the Secretary of State "as representing the framework within
which the best prospects for both security and development of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes may be found." (p. viii.) Its
recommendations have become the basis of the official policy of
our Government, in so far as the Executive has the authority to
define it, through the statement of Mr. Baruch as American repre-
sentative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
The principal conclusions of the Report have received such
widespread publicity that it is scarcely necessary to repeat them
here. They may be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) That it is possilbe to establish a system of international
controls of atomic energy which will provide, as a minimum, ade-
quate safeguards against a surprise attack with atomic weapons
by any nation:
(2) That such a system must be based upon direct and exclu-
sive control in the hands of an International Authority, specifi-
cally created for the purpose, of the raw materials, uranium and
thorium, which provide the sources of atomic energy, and of the
production from those raw materials of the fissionable materials,
U 235 and plutonium, from which atomic energy is directly de-
rived;
*This book review first appeared in Volume 41 of the Illinois Law Review at
page 290, and we are indebted to that publication and the author for permission to
reprint it.
**The Doubleday publication contains an excellent preface by Professor I. I.
Rabi, briefly explaining certain fundamental scientific conceptions with respect to
the production of atomic energy. With the aid of this preface the lay reader, no
matter how unversed in the sciences he may be, should have no difficulty in under-
standing the Report. My page references are to the State Department publication.
1 The Board of Consultants who signed the Report consisted of the following:
Mr. David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who acted as
Chairman of the consulting board; Mr. Chester I. Barnard, President of the New
Jersey Bell Telephone Company; Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, of the California
Institute of Technology and the University of California: Dr. Charles Allen Thomas,
Vice President and Technical Director, Monsanto Chemical Company: and Mr. Harry
A. Winne, Vice President in Charge of Engineering Policy, General Electric Com-
pany. The Secretary of State's Committee consisted of Dean Acheson, Chairman.
Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Major General Leslie R. Groves. and John J. Mc-
Cloy.
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(3) That this direct control must be supplemented with a
system of licensing and inspection, by the International Authority,
of the use of fissionable materials in relatively "safe" activities,
i.e., those that cannot be readily diverted to the production of
atomic weapons;
(4) That the Authority itself must be adequately staffed so
as to be capable of leading the way in atomic research and in the
development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as well as
carrying on continuously the exploration, production, licensing
and inspection duties conferred upon it.
These basic conclusions were all adopted in Mr. Baruch's state-
ment to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, with the
additional suggestion that there be provision for immediate and
certain penalties for violation of the terms of the basic agreement
establishing the international authority and for illegal interfer-
ence with or defiance, of the authority.
But the Report itself is deserving of careful attention, not
merely for its final recommendations but also for the clarity and
vigor of the analysis underlying them. At the outset, the Report
establishes the hopelessness of attempting to remove interna-
tional rivalry in production of atomic weapons either through the
mere outlawry of such weapons, or through a system of inspection
alone without effective international control of the raw materials
and of the production of fissionable materials. The first could
be only a pious expression of hope; the second would involve such
an army of inspectors attempting to cover virtually every factory
and every laboratory in every land where atomic energy might
conceivably be developed, that the very magnitude of the task
would spell its doom, even if it could be reconciled with the in-
terests of privacy. This is particularly true because it is impos-
sible to produce atomic energy for peaceful purposes without at
the the same time producing materials suitable for atomic exnlo-
sives. On the other hand, the Report recognizes the serious objec-
tions to a system which would vest in the International Authority
a total monopoly of all asuects of atomic energy. Such a system
would cut so deeply into the private institutions of some countries
and into the national institutions of others that, as the Report
states, "many of the complexities, irritations, the engendering of
suspicion, and the encouragement of deceit that we found mil-
itated against a system of safeguards based upon national and
international inspection would to a lesser degree be repeated by
such an all-out proposal for centralization." (p. 25.)
It is precisely at this point, however, that the distinction be-
tween "safe" and "dangerous" activities becomes of crucial im-
portance. Underlying this distinction are certain dominant facts.
The first of these relates to the peculiar position occupied 'by the
elements uranium and thorium - particularly uranium - in the
development of atomic energy. In this connection, the Report
offers the following explanation:
"...Uranium is the only natural substance that can main-
tain a chain reaction. It is the key to all foreseeable applica-
tions of atomic energy....
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".... Thorium cannot maintain a chain reaction, either itself
or in combination with any other natural material than ura-
nium. Nevertheless, it occupies an important position with re-
gard to safeguards. The reason for this is the following: With-
out uranium, chain reactions are impossible, but with a fairly
substantial amount of uranium to begin with and suitably
large quantities of thorium a chain reaction can be established
to manufacture material which is an atomic explosive and
which can also be used for the maintenance of other chain re-
actions.
"Absolute control of uranium would therefore mean adequate
safeguard regarding raw materials. Yet, since any substantial
leakage of uranium through the system of controls would make
possible the exploitation of thorium to produce dangerous
amount of atomic explosives, provisions governing thorium
should be incorporated in the system to compensate for possible
margins of error in the control of uranium. The coexistence
of uranium and thorium in some natural deposits makes this
technically attractive." (p. 13.)
Thus the key to an adequate system of international controls be-
comes exclusive ownership and absolute control by the internation-
al authority of the raw materials, uranium and thorium, from
which alone the fissionable materials suitable for atomic explosives
can be produced. "Dangerous" activities are, therefore, defined
to comprise in general the extraction of the raw materials ura-
nium and thorium, as well as the development of the fissionable
materials themselves.
There are also certain basic facts which are essential to the
definition of "safe" activities. In the first place there are various
by-product materials, resulting from the development of atomic
energy, the release and use of which can be of no significance in
the manufacture of atomic weapons. With reference to such use
the Report states:
"(1) Perhaps the clearest case is the application of radio-
active material as traces in scientific, medical, and technological
studies. This is a field in which progress may be expected to be
very rapid, and we can see no reason at all for limiting, on
grounds of safety, the activities using such tracer materials."
(p. 27.)
Secondly, the fiissionable materials, U 235 and plutonium, can be
so treated as to make them unsuitable, without a major operation,
for use in atomic weapons. In this connection the Report states:
... U 235 and plutonium can be denatured; such denatured ma-
terials do not readily lend themselves to the making of atomic ex-
plosives, but they can still be used with no essential loss of effec-
tiveness for the peaceful applications of atomic energy." (p. 26).
It is activities concerned with the use of such materials, produced
and furnished by the Authority, which would be licensed by the
Authority and which would be carried on through piivate or na-
tional institutions. Such operations would be subject to a system
of inspection by the Authority designed to insure against any
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attempt to convert the denatured materials back into materials
suitable for atomic explosives, or otherwise to convert "safe" ac-
tivities into "dangerous" activities.
The Report does not pretend that the line distinguishing
"safe" from "dangerous" activities would be a simple or static
one, or that the licensing and inspection system necessary for its
effectuation would be entirely without burdens and complexities.
It does, however, make a strong case for the proposition that these
problems would be reduced to manageable proportions, provided,
of course, that the Authority is given complete and exclusive con-
trol of the raw materials and of the production of fissionable ma-
terials, and is also adequately staffed with scientists and engineers
in the forefront of atomic energy research and development. The
crucial points here are that the denatured fissionable materials
could be obtained only from the Authority; that the Authority
would be able to prescribe conditions for operation designed to
minimize the opportunity for diversion and evasion as well as to
reduce the burdens of inspection; that any departure from these
prescribed conditions of operation would in itself be a violation
rehulting, at the least, in cutting off the supply of the denatured
materials.
It is noteworthy that the Report, unlike Mr. Baruch's state-
ment before the Atomic Energy Commission, does not suggest any
system of sanctions for enforcing compliance with the basic agree-
ment establishing the Authority, or with the regulations of the
Authority. In the case of minor infractions by a licensee it is, of
course, implicit ih the plan that the result may be withdrawal of
the license and denial of any further supply of fissionable materi-
als. The Report also suggests that any questions with respect to
the Authority's right of access for geological survey or for .in-
spection of installations might be resolved by submission to an in-
ternational body such as the International Court. But so far as
any nation's defiance of the Authority is concerned, the Report
relies for its sanctions upon the circumstances that the facilities
for the production of atomic energy will not be confined to a single
country; that the system itself will make it impossible to embark
upon a plan for the illegal production of atomic explosives with-
out immediate discovery by the Authority. Thus no nation could
reasonably hope to achieve any substantial advantage in a race
for atomic weapons by violation of the agreement; such action
would invite either international intervention or the seizure by
each nation of the atomic energy materials and productive facili-
ties within its borders and the resumption of international rivalry
in the production of atomic weapons. In elaborating this point
the Report states:
". .. Seizures will afford no immediate tactical advantage.
They would in fact be an instantaneous dramatic danger signal,
and they would permit, under the conditions stated, a substan-
tial period of time for other nations to take all possible meas-
ures of defense. For it should be borne in mind that even if
facilities are seized, a year or more would be required after seiz-
ure before atomic weapons could be produced in quantities suf-
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ficient to have an important influence on the outcome of war."
(p. 48.)
In order to give each nation the sense of security thus contem-
plated, it is, of course, essential that agreement should be reached
at the outset upon a satisfactory geographical distribution among
various nations of productive facilities for the development of
atomic energy.
It is also noteworthy that Mr. Baruch's statement, although
it emphasizes the importance of penalties "of as serious a nature
as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their
execution as possible," does not suggest the specific means by
which such penalties are to be imposed. It seems inescapable that
if the violations are of a national rather than individual character,
the only sanction must be war. I venture to suggest that insist-
ence upon agreement with respect to sanctions as a prerequisite
to the establishment of an international authority along the lines
described may be to sacrifice the entire plan on account of failure
to agree in advance upon forms of collective action if the plan
should fail in operation. Mr. Baruch said: "But before a country
is ready to relinquish any winning weapons, it must have more
than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not
only against the offenders in the atomic area, but against illegal
users of other weapons - bacteriology, biological, gas - perhaps
- why not? - against war itself." But how, so long as the prin-
cipal instruments of military power remain under the control of
individual nations, can such guaranties be provided by internation-
al authority? The Report seems to rest on a more realistic basis
in recognizing as the greatest incentive to compliance, the reali-
zation by each nation that so long as the authority is allowed to
function freely and without interference every nation will be as
safe as human ingenuity can devise from surprise attack by
atomic weapons.
To some the conclusions of the Report may be objectionable
on the ground that they ignore the problem of the veto power and
do not go far enough in the direction of real world government.
To others they may be equally objectionable because they involve
relinquishment of the preeminent position which the United States
is now assumed to have with respect to the weapons of atomic
warfare. To both types of criticism there are I submit, com-
pelling answers.
In answer to the first kind of objection, it may be truly said
that the recQmmendations of the Report represent the greatest
single step toward world government ever seriously proposed by
a great nation. Within its own sphere of activity the Authority
would be indeed an instrument of world government. It is also
implicit in the proposal that with respect to the internal opera-
tions of the Authority there would be no room for the veto power.
The Authority would be carrying on day to day operations rough-
ly comparable both to those of the Tennessee Valley Authority
and to those of some of our regulatory commissions. In the course
of such operations there would be required a continuous series of
decisions which obviously could not wait until the principle of
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unanimity. For its successful operation the Authority would
depend, of course, upon the support of all the great nations. But
this would be true of any world government, at least in its initial
stages, until it had won the allegiance of the peoples of those na-
tions and effective control of their military power.
To those who object that the recommendations of the Report
involve a foolhardy surrender of our present advantage in atomic
weapons it seems fair to say that if there is ever to be a time when
it will be to our advantage to press for such an agreement, this is
the time. The scientists who are in a position to express an in-
formed judgment are apparently unanimous in the view that our
monopoly of atomic weapons is bound to disappear in the not too
distant future.2 If we can achieve agreement along the basic lines
of the Report while that monopoly is still in existence, we need
not fear that other nations who have agreed to the establishment
of the International Authority, have in fact concealed atomic
bombs for use in an emergency. Indeed, since we are by hypo-
thesis the only nation with the atomic bomb, it is our own good
faith in which the greatest reliance will have to be placed, since
there can hardly be any effective way of determining whether
we have in fact destroyed our entire supply. It is true, of course,
that other nations who have not yet produced atomic bombs, might
nevertheless, before creation of the International Authority,
secrete sufficient quantitites of uranium and thorium to make
possible the illegal production of atomic weapons. But this risk is
small, indeed, compared with the risk of the secretion of atomic
'bombs once they have been produced. In this connection the fol-
lowing statement in the Report is particularly relevant:
"As we have pointed out repeatedly, the Authority will be
aided in detection of illegal operations by the fact that it
is not the motive but the operation which is illegal. Any na-
tional or private effort to mine uranium will 'be illegal; any
such stockpiling of thorium will be illegal; the building of any
primary reactor or separation plant will be illegal. This circum-
stance is of very great importance for the following reasons:
It is true that a thoroughgoing inspection of all phases of the
industry of a nation will in general be an unbearable burden;
it is true that a calculated attempt at avasim may, by camou-
flage or by geographical location, make the specific detection of
an illegal operation very much more difficult. But the total
effort needed to carry through from the mine to the bomb, a
surreptitious program of atomic armament on a scale sufficient
to make it a threat or to make it a temptation to evasion, is so
vast, and the number of separate difficult undertakings so hard
2 See, for example, statement of Dr. Irving Langmuir, Associate Director of the
Research Laboratory, General Electric Co.: "It has already been brought out by all
scientists who have worked in this field and have spoken about it that there is no
'secret of the atomic bomb' which can be permanently kept. The Smyth report and
the fact that successful bombs can be made by several processes enable any nation
attempting to build bombs to concentrate on one process and to start work simul-
taneously on separate phases of the problem." Hearings before Special Committee
on Atomic Energy, U. S. Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 179 (p. 110). And statement of
Professor Harold C. Urey: "My guess is that it will take 5 or 10 years for other in-
dustrial countries to secure atomic bomb plants. It depends somewhat upon which
country, and it depends upon the effort that is put forward." Id. (p. 85).
BAR BRIEFS
to conceal, that the fact of this effort should be impossible to
hide. The fact that it is the existence of the effort rather than
a specific purpose or motive or plan which constitutes an eva-
sion and an unmistakable danger signal is to our minds one of
the great advantages of the proposals we have outlined." (pp.
40-41.)
At this writing recent developments within the United Na-
tions Atomic Enegry Commission may seem to render discussion
of the recommendations of the Report somewhat academic. It is
worth remembering, however, that the conclusions of the Report
did not spring full-blown from the minds of the authors as a re-
sult of a priori reasoning. Rather they were evolved from pa-
tient, painstaking, and time-consuming exploration of the facts.
If men of such diverse training and background as collaborated in
the preparation of the Report, "found themselves at the end of a
month's absorption in the problem not only in complete agree-
ment that a plan could be devised, but also in agreement on the
essentials of a plan" (Introduction p. xi), it is perhaps too early
to despair that a similar patient exploration of the facts 'by mem-
bers of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission will pro-
duce a similar result.
Nathaniel L. Nathasont
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
